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Abstract
We introduce a game of complete information with multiple principals and multiple
agents. Each agent takes an action which can affect the payoffs of all principals and all
agents. Each principal offers monetary transfers to each agent conditional on the action
taken by the agent. We characterize pur~strategy equilibria and we provide conditions
- in terms of game balancedness - for the existence of an equilibrium with an efficient
outcome. Games played through agents display a type of strategic inefficiency which is
absent when either there is a unique principal or there is a unique agent.
1 Introduction
A game played though agents occurs when a set of players (the agents) take decisions that
affect the payoffs of another set of players (the práncápals) and the principals can, by means
of monetaty inducements, try to influence the decisions of the agents. In other words, a game
played though agents is a multi-principal multi-agent game.
The original principal-agent framework - which has one principal and one agent. - has been
extended in a general way in two directions: (1) Many principals and one agent (Bernheim
and Whinston's [3] common agency); and (2) One principal and many agents (Segal's [12]
contracting with externalities). The objective of this paper is to consider the general case
with many principals and many agents. Multi-principal multi-agent problems azise in political
economy, industrial organization, and auction theory:
Lobbying A widespread way of modeling interest group politics is through common agency
(e.g. Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman [6]). There are many lobbies (principals) and one
politician (the agent). However, modern democracies aze chazacterized by a multiplicity of
public decision-makers. This is true both in terms of organs (division of powers) and in terms
of organ members (many organs - such as parlaments - are collegial). Interest groups with
opposing interests will flght eachother by trying to manoeuver the decision-making of several
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agents. Hence, it would be important to know if there are diffetences between the case with
one politician and the case with multiple politicians.l
Supply Contracts An industry with sevetal firms (r~tailers) uses inputs produced by an-
other industry with several firms (suppliers). The suppliers propose contracts to the retailers.
A contract proposed by one supplier may cover not only the relation between that supplier
and the retailer, but also the relation between the retailer ans the other suppliers (such as
an exclusionary clause). The problem with several suppliers but only one retailer has been
studied in a general way by Bernheim and Whinston [4], with the important conclusion that,
without restrictions on bilateral retailer-manufaturing contracting, the contractual arrange-
ments that azise in equilibrium are efficient (Bork's Thesis). Does this efficiency result hold
when there are multiple retailers?
Auctions Common agency can be regarded as a generalized form of auction, in which the
suctioneer has preferences over the final allocation, bidders may have externalities with ea-
chother, and multiple units may be sold (See Bernheim and Whinston [3]). The buyers are
the principals and the auctioneer is the agent. However, common agency assumes that the
auctioneer is unique. In reality there may be several auctions with the same buyers but
different suctioneers. In the wave of privatizations that has swept Europe, the same buyers
(or subsets thereof) have faced eachother in asset sales run by different auctioneers (national
governments). The problem is made interesting by the fact that the buyers' payoffs are not
separable in the outcome of the different auctions. For instance, economies of scale may
lead to conjecture that the payoff from winning both auctions in two neighboring countries
is higher than the sum of the payoffs of winning the auction in each country sepazately. A
common agency auction considered in isolation always has an efficient equilibrium (in which
the allocation maximizes the sum of bidders' valuations). Is it true that several common
agency auctions viewed together always have an efficient equilibrium?2
A game played through agents is as follows. There aze a set of principals and a set of
agents. Each agent must choose an action out of a feasible set of actions (policy choices in
the case of lobbying, quantity orders in supply contracts, or object allocations in auctions).
Each principal offers to each agent a schedule of monetary transfers contingent on the agent
choosing a certain action (campaign contributions, supply contracts, or bids). Given the
principals's transfer schedules, an agent chooses his action to maximize the sum of transfers
he receives from the principals minus the cost of undertaking the action. A principal chooses
his transfer schedules to maximize the utility from the agents' actions minus the sum of
transfers he makes to agents.
So far, we have been intentionally vague about timing. The simplest structure is a two-
stage game, in which first all principals simultaneously choose their transfer schedules and
then all agents observe the schedules and simultaneously choose their actions. We will work
with this timing structure for most of the paper. However, some of the examples above present
more complicated timing structures, which include elements of sequentiality. For instance,
1Groseclose and Snyder's [7) constitute exceptione in that they wnsider multiple po6cy-makers. In Section 4,
we will considet Groseclose and Snyder's vote buying model in detail.
~Another interesting example of games played through agents is in international taxation: nationa! govern-
ments (principals) compete to attract international firms (agents) by offering subsidies and tax breaks to firms
that relocate on their territory. See Besley and Seabright [5~.
~
it would be a coincidence that two countries hold auctions simultaneously. More likely, one
auction starts after the outcome of the other is known. In Section 8 we will consider possible
sequential variants of the simultaneous game and show that the main results still hold.
Our main focus is efficiency, which we define according to the Utilitarian criterion. An
outcome is efficient if it maximizes the sum of the payoffs of all agents and all principals.
If there is a unique agent, Bernheim and Whinston have shown that there always exist an
equilibrium (the truthfu! equilibrium) that produces an efficient outcome. If, instead, there is
a unique principal, Segal shows that, if a certain type of externalities among agents' payoff
functions is absent, then there always exists an efficient equilibrium. Hence, in both these
limit cases, if there are no direct externalities among agents, efficient equilibria exist.
However, it turns out that, even when there are no direct externalities among agents,
a multi-principal multi-agent game need not have an efficient equilibrium. The presence of
multiple players on both sides creates a strategic externality that makes it impossible to
achieve the efficient outcome. The main result of this paper is to provide a general necessary
and sufHcient condition for the existence of an efficient equilibrium. This condition relates to
the cooperative concept of balancedness, which we extend - with some important differences
- to our game. In the present context, balancedness has a noncooperative interpretation in
terms of weighted deviations from the equilibrium outcome and sheds light on the nature
of the strategic interaction between principals and agents. Moreover, the balancedness of a
game can be checked in a straightforward way.
The organization of the paper is as follows. As the existence of inefficiency in our model
does not depend on direct externalities among agents, we develop our core argument under
the assumption that agents have no direct preference on outcomes but only want to maximize
the sum of transfers they receive from principals. This keeps notation lighter and allows to
focus on the original contribution of the paper. Only in the end of the paper, we consider the
general case in which agents have also direct preferences and we show that our results extend.
We begin with the fotmal presentation of the game in Section 2. In Section 3 we give
a characterization of pure-strategy equilíbria that we will use in the rest of the paper. In
Section 9, we focus on a simplified version of the game, in which each agent has only two
possible actions. This simplification avoids issues of coordination among principals. The
main result is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an ef6cient equilibrium,
which we then discuss in relation of to the literature. In Section 5 we allow agents to have
more than two actions. To deal with coordination problems, we introduce and study weakly
truthJu! equilibria, which are an extension of Bernheim and Whinston's truthful equilibrium
to games with many agents. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for their existence.
In Section 6, we extend our analysis to the case in which agents have direct preferences
on outcomes. In Section 7 we show that a mixed-strategy equilibrium must always exist.
In Section 8, we probe the robustness of our results against alternative timing structures, in
which either principals move sequentially (principnl sequentiality) or agents move sequentially
(agent sequentiality). Section 9 concludes by examining the implications of our results for the
three examples of games played through agents discussed above.
2 The Game
There is a set M of principals and a set N of agents. Let rn denote the typical element of
M and n the typical element of N. We emphasize that there is no natural relation between
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any of the principals and any of the agents. The game takes place in two stages: first the
principals move simultaneously, then the agents move simultaneously.3
Each agent has a finite pure set of actions Sn. Let S- j-[nEN Sn and H- UnENSN. The
typical element of S is an outcome s-(sl, .. ., sn) and the typical element of H is a pair
(n, sn). Each principal chooses a vector of nonnegative transfers tn` E ~ttH which specifies
the transfer from her to each agent for each action of that agent. Thus, tán is the tranfer of
principal m to agent n conditional on agent n choosing action sn. Agent n receives money
only for the action that he actually chooses, but he may receive money from more than one
principal.
For most of the paper, we assume that agents only care about the amount of monetary
transfers they collect, and not about the actions that they take. Agent n's payoff if he chooses
action sn is ~„~E,y ten. Principals care both about money and the actions that agents choose.
Let Gá ` be the gross payoff to Principal m if action s is chosen by the agents. The net payoff of
principals is assumed to be separable in gross payoff and money. The net payoff to Principa]
m if she offers transfers {t;n}in,,nlEy and agents choose s is G; -~nEN tá
n 4
The extensive form game is as follows. First, each principal chooses her vector of transfers
to the agents simultaneously and noncooperatively. Second, the vectors of all principals aze
publicly announced to agents, who then choose their actions.
We focus here on pure strategies.s The strategy set of Principal m is the subset T"` -
J2tH. A pure strategy for m is simply an element of Tn`. Let T- II,,,E,~tT"`. The strategy set
for Agent n is Sn. A pure strategy for Agent n is an : T~ Sn. A pure-strategy equilibrium
of the transfer game is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game in which each
agent and each principals uses a pure-strategy:
Definition 1 A pure strategy equtilibrium of a transfer game is a pair (t,ó), where i-
(tan)mEM,nEN,s~ESn and ó- (Un)nEN, in which:
(iJ For every n E N, nnd every t E T,
ón(t) E argmax,.,Eg„ ~ ten
mEM
(iá) For every m E M, given ( t~)~~,n, tn` solves:
max Gg` - ~ t;n
tm nEN
StLÓ'feet t0
Sn - O'(tm, t-m).
We now define efficiency. Following Bernheim and Whinston [3] and Segal [12], we use
a utilitarian criterion. An action is efficient if it maximizes the sum of the net payoffs of all
players (agents and principals). ~Yansfers can be neglected, and the definition of efficiency is:
3Sequential variations of the game are considered in Section 8.
aThe separabiGty assumption does not appear to be crucial to the results presented here, as it is not crucial
to the results obtained in common agency (Di~át, Grossman, and Helpman (6]).
óMixed strategies are considered in Section 7.
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for every s E S.
The outcome of an equilibrium is the action profile chosen by agent in that equilibrium.
We will sometimes say that an "equilibrium is efficient," meaning that the outcome of that
equilibrium is efficient.
3 A First Characterization of Pure Strategy Equilibria
A pure sttategy equilibrium is charactetized by three conditions, which are formally reported
in Theorem 1 below. They are derived using the idea, common in principal-agent problems,
that we may think of principals as choosing the action of the agents, provided they give the
appropriate incentive to the agents. The conditions are:
1. Each agent chooses an action that maximizes his payoff. This is the condition (AM)
(Agent Maximization) below.
2. Given the transfers of the other principals, Principal m can induce agents to choose any
particular action provided that she puts high enough transfers on that action. The cost
for m to induce s rather than s is ~~~,,,;~ -~j~,,, tá~, which is the minimum sum of
transfers sufHcient to induce agents to move from s to s. The benefit is C; - G; . If
s is an equilibrium, then the cost of a deviation must be greater than the benefit of a
deviation for each m and each s, which is what Condition (IC) (Incentive Compatibility)
requires.
3. Each principal sets his transfers so that the cost of implementing s is minimal. There
cannot be a way in which principal nz reduces her equilibrium transfers for s without
deviating from s. This is condition (CM) (Cost Minimization).6
Formally, this is the characterization.
Theorem 1 A pair (t', s) of transfers and action profiles tis a pure strategy equilibrium out-
come if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
(AM) for every n E N, sn E Sn,
(IC~ for every m E M, s E S,
~` t~rnn ~ ~` t~rnn.
L. 8,. L, s"
mEAf mEbf
c; t~~ i;~ ~ c; f~~ ïá~;
nEN j~m nEN j~m
eNote that what we call (AM) is what is usually called incentive-compatibility in principal-agent problems.
However, it ís useful here to age the term incentive compatibiGty for the principaLs' choices. While the
agent mabmization problem is characterized by one condition (AM), the principal maximization problem is
characterized by two conditions (IC) and (CM). Then it is useful to distinguish between principal incentive
compatibility ( which is across actiona) and principal cost minimization ( which is for the equilibrium action).
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(CM) for every m E M, n E N,
Pmof: Condition (AM) is clearly necessary and sufficient for the action sn to be a best
response of the agent n to the transfers of the principals.
To prove the statement for the two remaining conditions, we chazacterize the best response
of a principal m to a given choice (tj)j~,,, of transfers of the other principals. To lighten the
notation, we write:
Clearly for m the only relevant quantity is value of the matrix (T,~`n)nEN,a~ESn. Consider now
the maximum over the agents' actions of the transfers that the other principals are promising
to him, and the direct payoff of the agents: maxnES.. Tá`n
The principal m can induce from the agents the choice of any vector of actions s E S
provided he promises a transfer greater than
(á aX Tán) - T;n.
ES"
to the agent n for the action sn. Principal m will not choose s(and ( s, t' is not an equilibrium)
unless s solves
max G;" -~[(maX Tán) - T; n].
sES nEN
aESn
But ~nE~, maxaES.. TQ`n is a constant independent of s, so s solves the problem (2) if and
only if it satisfies (IC).
Finally we consider the condition (CM). The following lemma is very simple, but we state
it for convenience. The proof is elementary.
Lemma 1 For every action pmfile s" and every vector T'n, the cost minimization pmólem in
tm - (tsn)nEN,sES ~ O
min ~ t',-n.,n suóject to t;n f T;n~ t;" f T;n, for every n E N, s E S (3)
~m nEN
has value c(s,Tn`) equal to ~nEN~(m~aESn Tá`n) - Tsn], and solution any ts" 1 0 such
that:
~ tán - max ~ ;~.
mEM snES~ j~m
n mTs̀ - ~ t;., .
j ~m
(2)
tánn - ( maXTán) -Tán,
aES~
tén G ( max Tá`n) - T;", for every sn.
aES~
If we apply the lemma choosing as s the candidate equilibrium action profile s, we get
that tn` is a solution of the problem of minimum cost to implement s if and only if:




t~n G maX Tmn
- ~.mn
s~ nES~ a a
(5)
Ó
for every s. But (4), (5), and (AM) are equivalent to (4) and (AM). Since (4) is (CM), we
have concluded our proof. ~
Some of the properties of an equilibrium are worth pointing out explicitly:
Corollary 1 for all n there is an s E S" `sn such that:
[-` tmn - [-` tmn (6)
[J a~ jJ ee
mEM mEM
Proof: Suppose for some n ~,,,E,y tán 1 ~mEM tà~ (the case "C" is prevented by (AM)).
Take any m. By (CM), either t;n- O or there exists a s different from s such that
~j~m tán- ~mEM tá~n. The second case would be an immediate contradiction. Suppose
then that t;n- 0. This is true for all m. Hence, ~,,,EM t;~ - 0 and we have a contradiction.
For every agent, there exists an action different from the equilibrium action with the same
amount of transfers of the equilibrium action. This is an immediate consequence of (CM). If
this were not the case, then at least one of the principals could teduce het transfer on t.
Moreover, for every n and every m, there exists an action a(m,n) (which could be sn)
such that
(i) ~ tá" - ~ ;~, and (lÍ) tán - O. (7)
jEM jEM
Consider the subset of S" for which Agent n gets the maximal amount of transfers (and we
know from Corollary 1 that this subset has at least two elements). ( 7) says that each principal
makes a zero transfer on at least one of the actions in this subset. If this were not true, (CM)
would be violated. Principal m could reduce her equilibrium transfers without modifying the
outcome. Equation 7 implies that, given the equilibrium transfers, if a principal disappeared
(and all her transfers were zero), none of the agents would be hurt.
4 Agents with Two Actions
In this section we introduce the main results of the paper in a simplified environment in which
each agent has only two actions. We proceed as follows: Subsection 4.1 restates the char-
acterization theorem in this simplifies environment. Subsection 4.2 provides four examples.
Subsection 4.3 states the main theorem: a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence
of an efficient equilibrium. Subsection 4.4 discusses the condition.
4.1 Characterization
We denote by (sn)' the action of n different from sn. The following is the equivalent of
Theorem 1 in this simplified environment:
Proposition 1 If qS" - 2 for every n E N, then the pair (t, s) is n pure strategy equiliórium
outcome if and only if
(AM) For every n E N, s E S
[-` tYnn - C1 t~n~li~
mEM mEM
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(IC) For every m E M, s E S:
G; f ~ ~ tán ~ Gá ~ ~ ~ ~;~;
nEN j~m nEN j~m
(CM) For every m E M, n E N,
if t',-'.,̀n ~ 0 then t~e~), - 0.
Proof: Immediate from Theorem 1 and (6). ~
With two actions per agent, (CM) implies that, for each agent, no ptincipal can make
more than one strictly positive transfer the sum of transfers for one action is exactly equal
to the sum of transfers for the other action. If either of these conditions is violated, some
principal can reduce their transfers without changing the outcome.
A couple of observations aze straightforward from Proposition 1. By summing (AM) over
n and subtracting it from (IC) applied to s-((sn)', s-n), we have that for all n
which, combined with (CM) implies that for any m and any n
either í;n- 0 and L~~np 1 G((;n),,;-~) - G; (8)
or C;n c G; - G((,-n)~,,--~) and ï~;~), - 0.
Moreover, in the two actions case, the action outcome of a pure strategy equilibrium is
efficient:
Proposition 2 If qSn - 2 for every n E N, then pure strategy equilibria are efÏ'icient.
Proof: If we add ( IC) over m E M we get that for every s:
~ G; -~ (M - I) ~ ~
t',.m ~ ~ G; f (M - 1) ~ ~ ~m'
mEM nENmEhf - mEA! nENmEM
which, by (AM), implies ~,,,EM G; ? ~mEM ~`~ ~
The assumption that ~Sn - 2 is essential. As we shall see in Section 5, with more than
three actions a pure strategy equilibrium need not be efficient. Instead, the assumption that
agents do not care about actions is not essential. Proposition 2 can easily be proved in the
case in which agents caze about actions.
4.2 Examples
We consider a few examples with M- N- {1,2}, Fn - 0 and aS` - 2 for both agents.
We denote the agents' actions as Sl -{T, B} and S2 -{L, R}. We adopt the convention of





It is important to keep in mind that this is not the usual payoff matrix. The actions refer
to agents while the payoffs refer to principals. Also, these aze gross payoffs. The net payoffs
will be given by the gross payoffs minus the transfers. The transfer vector tn` is written as
(tTl~tBt~tL2~tR21~
Prisoner's Dilemma The payoffs of the principals aze:
L R
T x, x z, y
B y,z 0,0
with y~ x ~ 0 1 z and 2x 1 y f z. The efficient action is unique: (T, L). Hence, by
Proposition 2, if a pure-strategy equilibrium exists, it must have (T, L) as outcome. By
(CM), the first principal does not pay for the action T, and the second does not pay for
L. By (AM), the payment on each action from the two principals must be the same; so the
equilibrium transfers are pairs of the form:
tl -(0, a; b, 0), t2 -(a, 0; 0, 6). (9)
The (IC) condition for the first principal is x f a 1 max{z f n-F 6, y, b}, and x-~ 6 1
max{z f a f 6,y,a} for the second. So the set of pure strategy equilibria is given by any
transfer with (a,b) such that a,b E[y - x,x - z] and x 1 b- a ~-x. In particular,
there exists a minimal transfer equilibrium in which a - 6- y- x. The agents choose T,
respectively L, whenever indifferent. The rent of each agent is at least the difference between
the best outcome and the "cooperate" outcome, but can get as high as the difference between
"cooperate" and the bad outcome.





xl f yt ~ x2 f y2,y1 S y2~x',y` ~ O,i - 1,2
Again there is a unique efficient outcome, (T, L), hence a unique equilibrium outcome in pure
strategy, if any. ~om Proposition 1 it is easy to see that there exists an equilibrium if there
are transfers tt -(a, 0; 6, 0), t2 -(0, a; 0, 6) that satisfy
xl-x2~a-~b~y2-yl~ (IO)
Clearly, ( 10) is satisfied for the parameters under consideration and an equilibrium with
outcome (T, L) always exists. The combined rent of the two agents is at least y2 - yl.
In the extreme "pure", coordination game with xl - y~ ) x2 - y2, zero transfers from
both principals, for each agent and each action is an equilibrium.
The prisoners' dilemma and the coordination game, when played through agents, have a
unique pure-strategy equilibrium, and this equilibrium is effïcient. The following examples
instead show that there are games in which a pure-sttategy equilibrium does not exist and




T 3, 0 0, x
B O,x O,x
with 1.5 G x G 3. The only possible pure strategy equilibrium outcome is (T, L), with
transfers tl -(a, 0; 6, 0) and t2 -(0, a; 0, b). The (IC) for the two principals are, respectively:
3? max{a, b, a f 6},
afó?max{xfa,xtó,x}.
Together, they imply 3? a f 6? 2x, which cannot be satisfied if x 1 1.5. No pure strategy
equilibrium exists and all other equilibria aze necessarily inefficient because they involve
outcomes different from (T, L) with positive probability.
This game can be interpreted as a lobbying problem. Principal 1 is a lobby who wants
to change the status quo. Principal 2 wants to keep things as they are. In order to change
the status quo, Principal 1 needs approval from two governmental bodies, Agent I and Agent
2. The efficient outcome is to change the status quo. However, Prncipal 2 enjoys a strategic
advantage because he only needs to convince one of the two agents to say no.
With some re-working, the Opposirte Interest Game can also be interpreted as a very
basic supply contract problem with two manufaturers (principals) and two retailers (agents).
Retailers are in sepazate markets (and therefore do not impose externalities on each other).
Each retailer needs exactly one unit of the input good produced by the manufacturers. The
total cost functions of the two manufactureres are as follows:
q 0 1 2
C-~3 3
C2 0 1 4
Manufacturer 1 has economies of scale and Manufacturer 2 has diseconomies. The efficient
allocation would be that I produces two units and 2 produces nothing. Let T represent
Retailer 1 buying his unit from Manufaturer 1 and let L represent Retailer 2 buying his
unit from Manufaturer 2. B and R are the opposite actions. Suppose that there is a`fixed'
price of 3 per unit but manufacturers can offer discounts (this is a quick way to overcome
the nonnegativity constraint - the whole analysis of this paper can be re-done without the
nonnegativity constraint or with other constraints). For instance, t~ is the discount over the
fixed price of 3 that Principal I offers to Agent 1 if he buys from her. Then, it is easy to
check that this supply contract problem is exactly equivalent to the Opposite Interest Game
examined above and has no efficient equilibrium. In order to achieve efficiency, Principal
1 should sell to both retailers but Principal 2 can easily undercut her on one of the two
retailers. The noncontractible externality here is that, if Principal 2 sells to Retailer 2, there
is an increase in the cost of production for the good that Principal 1 is still selling to Agent
1.7
'In Suluection 8.2 we will re-interpret the agent-sequential version oE the Opposite Interest Game as a
sequence of two auctions.
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Voting Game Our last example has more than 2 agents and is ínspired by Groseclose and
Snyder [7~. There are two principals, M- {1, 2}, and an odd number N- 2K f 1 of agents.
Each agent may vote for one of two alternatives, also labelled 1 and 2 and he may not abstain.
The alternative with the larger number of votes is chosen. The payoff of the principal 1 is
x~ 1 if the alternative 1 is chosen, and 0 if 2 is chosen. The payoff of Principal 2 is 1 if 2
is chosen and 0 otherwise. Thus, all action profiles such that q{n E N~sn - 1} ~ K t 1 are
efficient.
This game has no equilibrium in which alternative 1 is chosen for sure, and hence it has
only inefficient equilibria. To see this, suppose that an equilibrium exists, where alternative
1 is chosen for sure. In this equilibrium, Principal 2 must be paying no money to agents. If
it were not so, Principal 2 would get a negative payoff while she can always ensure a zero
payoff by offering zero to all agents. There are two cases: (i) Principal 1 makes a strictly
positive offer for certain to all agents; (ii) There is an agent n that receives zero offers from
both Principal 1 and Principal 2. In case (i), given any strategy of Principal 2, Principal 1
can still guarantee herself Alternative 1 but save money by making a zero offer to one of the
agents. In case (ii) Principal 1 could offer a zero transfer to one of the agents she is currently
offering a strictly positive transfer and make an infinitesimal transfer to the agent who is not
receiving anything. This shows that no equilibrium in which Alternative 1 is chosen for sure
ex1St5.8
4.3 Existence of pure strategy equilibria: Necessary and sufficient condi-
tion
In this section we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a pure-
strategy equilibrium. We know that pure-strategy equilibria are efficient (Proposition 2). It
is also easy to see that if an efficient mixed-strategy equilibrium exists, then there must also
exist an efficient pure-strategy equilibrium. Hence, for a game played through agents in which
agents have only two actions existence of pure-strategy equilibria and existence of efficient
equilibria aze equivalent.9
Before introducing the formal analysis, we motivate our definitions by considering a game
with two principals and two agents, with S" - {1,2} for both agents. Let S" -{1,2} for
both agents and let 11 be the efficient outcome, and thus the only candidate pure-strategy
equilibrium. There are three possible deviation: 12, 21, and 22. Let us combine the following
three ( IC): m- 1 and s - 22; m- 2 and s - 12; m- 2 and s - 21. Together, they imply
Gil - G22 -~ Gil - G12 f G11 - G21 ? 0.
This is the condition that could not be satisfied in the Opposite Interest Game. We rewrite
it in the somewhat cumbersome way:
~ wl(s)(G; - G;) t~ w2(s)(G; - G;) ~ 0. (11)
sES aES
sGraseclose and Snyder [7~ present the game in a sequential form. First Principal 1 makes offers. Then,
Principal 2 observes the offers made by 1 and makes her offers. They ehow that a principal may want to buy
a eupernwjonty, that is, make a positive offer to strictly more than K t 1 agents.
9For a generic game, there exi.9ts a unique efficient outcome and therefore all mixed strategy equilibria are
ineflicient. For a nongeneric geme with more than two eíficient outcomes, there may e~dst an eBicieat mixed-




wl(22) - w2(12) - w2(21) - 1 and wl(11) - wl(12) - wl(21) - w2(11) - w2(22) - 0(12)
The idea is that the w's are weights that principals put on possible deviations: wm(s) is the
weight Principal m puts on a deviation from s to s. The weights in (12) satisfy
wl(12) f wl(22) - w2(12) f w2(22); (13)
wl(21) f w~(22) - wz(21) -~ w2(22).. (14)
Condition (13) says that the sum of weights on deviations which involve the participation of
Agent 1 is the same for the two principals. Condition (14) is the same condition for Agent 2.
We make this into a general definition. First, howevet, an observation. Balanced weights,
and later balanced games, aze defined with respect to an action profile that is used ns a
reference point, namely s. We might indicate this explicitly in the definition, or lighten the
definitions and keep this as understood. We choose this second solution, but the reader should
be aware of this dependence.
Deftnition 3 If agents have only two actions, a vector (wn`(s)),,,EM,,ES is said to be a vector
of óalanced weights if wn`(s) ? 0 for every n nnd s, and
for every m E M,n E N ~ wn`(s) - ~ w~(s). (15)
{s:s~~àn} {e:a~~s~}
This definition generalizes (13) and (14), since {s : sn ~ sn} is the set of possible deviations
that involve the participation of Agent n. The sum of weights over this set must be constant
across principals. The interpretation is that each principal has the same opportunity to
influence the action of a particular agent. However, the principal may choose to use this
influence over different deviations.to
By summing (15) over n, we obtain that. if the weight corresponding to each deviation is
multiplied by the number of agents that must deviate to realize that deviation, then the sum
is constant:
Proposition 3 Ij a vector (wn`(s))mEM,sES ~ a vector of balnnced weights, then:
for every m E M, ~ wn`(s)~{n : sn ~ sn} -~ wt(s)~{n : sn ~ sn}.
aES aES
This is in agreement with the previous interpretation. The 'cost' of a deviation is pro-
portional to the number of agents that must be convinced. The total cost must equal the
endowment. Hence, deviations that involve a small numbers of agents are cheaper than devia-
tions with many agents. In the Opposite Interest Game, Principal 2 had two cheap deviations
and that made it hazd for Principal 1 to defend the efficient outcome.
Now, reconsider (eq:inwe). It asks that the sum of benefits from a deviation from 11 to 22,
weighted according to a particular vector of balanced weight, be nonnegative. We generalize
the condition as follows:
loAs the simple example of balanced weights (12) shows, the sum over s of the weights needs not be constant:
so, in particular, weights cannot be interpreted as probabilities.
12
Definition 4 A trnnsfer game is óalanced iJ and only if for every vector of balanced weights
(wn`(s))mEM,aES we have:
~ ~ wm(9)(~ - ~)
J ().
mEM aES
We are now ready to state our main result:
(16)
Theorem 2 A transfer game where agents have two actions has a pure stmtegy equilibrium
if and only if it is óalanced.
Pmof: From proposition 1 we derive that a pure strategy equilibrium exists if and only if the
three conditions of that proposition hold. If we denote
d'" - g~ - t(; l~
(AM) and ( IC) may be rewritten as
~ ~ d~n~G;-G;, foreverysES,kEM, (17)
{j:j~k} {n:a~~àr}
and
~ d~n - 0, for every n. (18)
jEM
The system (17) and (18) is a system of linear inequalities in the M x N variables djn. There
are M x S inequalities of the type in (17), each of them indexed by a pair (ms); and N
inequalities of the type (18), each indexed by i.
We can find a d that solves (17) and (18) if and only if we can find a t that solves
(AM), (IC), and (CM). The "if" part is by definition. The "only if" part can be seen as
follows. Suppose we find a d that solves (17) and (18). Let tá~ - max(0, -d~n) and t(a~, -
max(0, d~n). The resulting t satisfies (AM), (IC), and (CM). Hence, we have shown that there
exists a pure-strategy equilibrium with outcome s if and only if the system (17) and (18) has
a solution.
The following result is useful:ll
Theorem 3(Farl~s) Eaactly one of the following alternntives is true: (a) There exists a
solution x to the linear system of (in)equalities given by Ax ~ a and Bx - b; or (bJ There
exist vectors ls and v such that: (i) WA f vB - 0; (ii) p~ 0; and (iii) Wa f vb ~ 0.
We now apply Farkas' Lemma to (17) and (18). For m, j E M, i, n E N, s E S, let
1 if j~ m, sn ~ sn,




ama - ~ - (~` (19)
b; - 0 (20)
(21)
11See for instance Mangasarian (9).
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Then, (17) and (18) rewrite as Ad 7 a and Bd - b. By Farkas' Lemma a solution
(d~n)~EM,,,EN of that system exists if and only if there is no solution ((wm(S)mEM,sES, (Ut)iEN)
of the system:
for every j E M,n E N, ~ wn`(s)Al,,,,,~n] 1- ~ v`Bli,~„1 - 0; (22)
mEM,sES iEN
for every ra E Ms E S,wn`(s) ~ 0;
and
~ ~wm(s)(G9 -G;) 1 0. (23)
mEM sES
The system ( 22) may be rewritten as:
for every j E M,n E N, ~ wn`(s) -- vn. (24)
{s:sn~sn}
As this is the only restriction that the vaziables v are imposing, (24) is true if and only if w
is a vector of balanced weights.
Inequality (23) is the negation that the game is balanced for a particular vector of weights.
The lack of solution for the system (22) and (24) is equivalent to the requirement that for all
balanced weights the inequality
~ ~w"`(s)(Gá` -Gs`) ? 0
mEM eES
holds, and this is the statement we had to prove.
4.4 Remarks
1. Games of common agency are of course a special case of the games we are considering,
where N-{1}. In the case of an agent with two actions, the vector of weights wn`(s)seS
of the principal rn is a scalar, and the condition (15) that they are balanced requires
these scalars to the same. So a pure strategy equilibrium giving s" as equilibrium outcome
exists if and only if, for all s,
~ (Gs` - Gs ) ? 0,
mE A1
that is an equilibrium in pure strategies always exists, and it gives the efficient action,
which is in accord with Bernheim and Whinston [3].
2. The other extreme case is one principal and many agents, that is M-{1}. Balancedness
means that
~wl(s)(G; -G;) ? 0.
sES
for any nonnegative vector w(s). This is equivalent to G; - G; ? 0 for all s. Hence,
again, an efficient equilibrium always exists, which is the result that Segal [12] obtains
in absence of agent interdependences.
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3. Given a deviation s, a possible vector of balanced weights is, for every m E M,
1 ifs-s;
wm(s) - 0 otherwise.
(25)
This vector is balanced because each principal is asking exactly the same deviation from
all agents. Then, we get that a game is balanced only if, for every á E S,
~(C; -G;)~0
mEM
that is, ë is the efficient action. This is an indirect way of getting to Proposition 2. Of
course, efficiency does not in general imply balancedness. That is because the weighta
in (25) assume that all principals have the same `best' deviation and that need not be
true.
4. Let C(s) - a {s : sn ~ sn}, and NW denote the set of balanced weights, normalized by
~wm(s)C'i(s) - 1. (`iÓ)
aES
Since the inequality defining a balanced game is homogeneous, the condition
..mm ~ w"`(s)(G; - G;) ? 0
mE1N,aES
(27)
is necessary and sufficient fot existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies giving s as
action profile outcome. Now let
C-{(wm(9))mEM,sES . wm(s ) ~ 0 for every m, s, and ~ w"`(s)C(s) - 1}.
aES
By proposition (3), NW C C, and therefore a sufficient condition for the existence of
equilibria in pure strategies is
min ~ wn`(s)(G; - G; ) ? 0
wEC mEM,aES
But the set C has a product structure: a vector w belongs to C if and only if each m-th
component satisfies a set of constraints that only depend on wn`. The minimization
problem is equivalent to:
so we may state:
m~ min ~ C(s~~ ? fi' (28)
Proposition 4 An equiliórium in pure strategies giving s as equiliórium action pmfile
exists if (28) holds.
5. The following result makes Theorem 2 of immediate use from a computational point of
view:
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Proposition 5 If a transfer game is ónlanced for every vector oJ óalanced weighs w E
{0, 1}SM, then it is óalanced for every vector of óalanced weights.
Proof: From Definition 4, a transfer game is balanced if and only if the value of the
following linear program is negative:
subject to
wlk JJ J~ wm(9)(~ - Ga )
mE A1 sES
for every m E M, n E N: ~ wn`(s) - k",
{s:s~~s~}
foreverymEM,sES:wn`(s)~0.
This linear program is homogeneous in w and k. Hence, we can assume, without loss
of generality, that maxnEN kn - 1(if none of the k's is strictly positive, then the
proposition holds trivially). Each k" appears only in one constraint and does not appear
in the objective. Therefore, we can assume without loss of generality that, for every
n E N, k" E{0,1}.
Now, for every m and every s, wn`(s) E [0,1). Suppose that wn`(s) E ( 0,1). It is feasible
to both increase and decrease wn`(s) by varying wn` for s~ S. Hence, as the objective
function is linear, we can assume without loss of generality that w~`(s) E{0,1}. ~
The problem of deciding if a game played through agents has a pure strategy equilibrium
is now very simple. First, determine the set of efficient outcomes. Let s be an element
of this set ( it will be the unique element in a generic game). Then, apply Proposition 5
and examine all the possible matrices w E{0,1}sxbf Verify that for each w either w
is not balanced or (16) holds. The computation time is linear in the size of the problem
(MNS).
5 The General Case
We now leave the simplified environment where agents have only two actions, but we still
maintain the restriction that agents' payoffs do not depend on s directly.
If agents have more than two actions, a pure-strategy equilibrium need not be efficient.
This is already true if N-{1} (common agency). Consider the example (see [3]) where
M-{1,2},N -{1} and f~Sn - 4, with
~' -(8, 6, o, l), ~~ -(o, 6, ~,1)s (2s)
Here tl -(7, 0, 0, 0), t2 -(0, 0, 7, 0), and s- 1 is a pure strategy equilibrium with an
inefficient outcome. The main feature of this equilibrium is a failure of the two principals to
coordinate on the efficient action. Principal 1 does not make an offer on action 2 because
Principal 2 is not making an offer either, and viceversa. There exists another pure-strategy
equilibrium in which tl -(3,1, 0, 0), t2 -(0, 2, 3, 0), and s- 2, which selects the efficient
action and gives a higher payoff to both principals.
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To overcome this multiplicity of equilibria, in common agency Bernheim and Whinston
introduce the notion of truthful transfers. A transfer vector ia truthful if, for all actions, it is
equal to the principal's gross payoff minus a constant (save for the nonnegativity constraint
on transfers). Formally,
Deflnition 5 If N-{1}, a transjer vector t"` is truthful relative to s ij for every s E S
t; - max(0, tá t Gá` - G; )
An pure strntegy equilibrium giving s as equilibrium nction is trvthful if the strategy of every
principal is truthfu! relntive to s.
In common agency, truthful equilibria play a fundamental role. They always exist, the
equilibrium action outcome is efficient ([3, Theorem 2]) and they are coalition proof ([3,
Theorem 3]). The intuition is that truthful transfers restrict offers on out-of-equilibrium
actions not too be too low with respect to the principals' payoffs and therefore exhausts all
gains from coalitional deviations.
But truthful equilibria are very hard to come by in the transfer game. For instance, in
the prisoner's dilemma game a vector of truthful strategies should satisfy (disregarding the
nonnegativity constraints) n- y- x, 6- y for the first principal, and a- y, 6- y- x for
the second, and this is impossible. Intuitively, the requirement of being truthful impases too
many equations on the strategy.
However, one can relax Definition 5 from equality to inequality. A weaker condition is
that for every s E S, t; ? t; ~- G; - Gê`, or alternatively
~-tá ~ í(~a`-tá.
This definition maintains the feature that offers on out-of-equilibrium actions cannot be too
low and it can be extended to a transfer game with many agents:
Definition 8 In a transfer game, tm is weakly truthful relntive to s if
(WTJ ForeverymEMandsES,G; -~„E~,t;n?G; -~„ENtsn~
A weakly truthful equilibrium is n pure strategy equilibrium giving s as equilíbtium outcome,
and in which the strategy of every principal is weakly trvthful nelative to s.
A straightforward consequence of this definition is that - like truthful equiGbria of common
agency games - weakly truthful equilibria of transfer games are always efficient:
Theorem 4 The outcome oj n weokly truthful equitibrium is e~icient.
Proof: Sum the inequalities (WT) over m. Sum the inequalities AM in Theorem 1 over n.
Add the two resulting inequalities. The result is the inequality in (1), which defines efSciency.
The pair of action and transfer outcomes of a weakly truthful equilibrium has a simple
characterization. The necessary and sufficient conditions for an action profile to be supported
by a weakly truthful equilibrium are the same as those for an action profile to be supported
by an equilibrium (Theorem 1), except that (IC) is substituted with the stronger requirement
that transfers be weakly truthful:
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Theorem 5 A pair (i, s) of transfers arzd action profiles is the outcome of a weakly truthful
equilibrium if and only if they satisfy WT, AM arzd CM hold.
Proof: Sum (AM) over n. To the resulting inequality, add (WT). The result is (IC). Hence,
(WT) and (AM) imply (IC) and sufficiency is proven. Necessity is obvious because (AM) and
(CM) are necessary by Theorem 1 and (WT) is necessary by the definition of weakly truthful
equilibrium. ~
To check that the definition of weakly truthful equilibrium is consistent with the analysis
of the previous section, consider what happens to weakly truthful equilibria if each agent has
only two actions and cares solely about monetary payoff. In this case, it is immediate to
check that (AM) and (IC) imply (WT) and, by Theorem 5:
Corollary 2 if ench agent has only two nctions and cares solely nbout monetary payofj, then
all equilibria are weakly truthful.
Weak truthfulness eliminates inefficient equilibria that are due to coordination problems.
If each agent has only two actions, coordination problems do not arise because each principal
will contribute for either one action or the other. Hence, weak truthfulness has no bite.
We now move to the question of existence. As in the previous section, we pose the question
of existence with respect to a particular action profile, that is, we ask whether, given s E S,
there exists a weakly truthful equilibrium that produces outcome s. Let us redefine balanced
weights as follwos:
Deflnition 7 The vector w with dimension MS is a vector of óalanced weights if
for every m E M,n E N,an E 5"`~sn : ~ wn`(s) - ~ w~(s).
{s:s~-a~} {s:s~-a~}
If agents have only two actions, there is only one possible deviation for each agent. With
more than two actions, the condition that principals put the same sum of weight must. hold
for every agents nnd for every deviation that the agent has.
Let the definition of balanced game be exactly the same as in Definition 4. We are ready
to state the main result of this section:
Theorem 6 A transfer game has a weakly truthful equilibrium if and only if it is balanced.
Pmof: At this point, to prove existence we need to show that there exists a vector of transfers,
satisfying the (WT), (AM), and (CM). However, we can simplif,y our task by rewriting ts"-
t;n as d..~n and showing:
Proposition 6 There exists a weakly truthful equilibrium urith outcome s if and only if there
exists d E R~tH that satisfies
(WTd) For all s E S and all m E M,
~ d;" ~ G; - Ge`;
n:e~~èn
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(AMdJ For all n E N and nl! sn E Sn,
~ dá"C0.
mEM
Pmof of Proposition 6 Let d;n- t;n- tán. Then, (WTd) is (WT) and (AMd) is (AM).
Hence, the "only if" part is immediate.
To prove sufficiency, suppose that a vector d has been found that satisfies (WTd) and
(AMd). Clearly, there exists a vector t that satisfies (WT) and (AM). For every m and n,
take {tn`n,..},..ES~ and decrease each element t;n of the same amount (unless t;n- 0) until
one of the following is true:
either t;.," - 0;
or there exists s~ sn such that ~(tjr - t~~) - 0 and t;n- 0.
jEM
Repeat this operation for all m E M. This does not interfere with (WT) because it either
decreases both sides of the inequality of the same amount or it only decreases the left side.
Neither does it interfere with any of the (AM) because, for each n, it halts as soon as soon as
one of the inequalities becomes an equality. The new t, found in this manner, satisfies (CM)
by construction.
With Proposition 6, we can focus on necessary and sufficent conditions for the existence
of a vector d that solves (WTd) and (AMd). We use the following:
Theorem 7(Gale's Theorem of the Alternative) lZ Given n matrix A nnd a vector a,
either (i) there exists an x such that Ax 7 a; or (ii) there exists a y such that yA - 0, yc G 0,
and y 1 0. -
We rewrite (WTd) and (AMd) in a way that fits (i) of Theorem 7. Let
-1 lf ,J - m, sn
- a gn ~ sn
Bl~~~ral - 0 otherwise;
lifn-i,sn-a,
Ci~"~'al - 0 otherwise.
bma - ~ -~
c; - 0




'~See Mangasarian ~9, p. 33J.
19
we get (i) of Theorem 7.
By Theorem 7, (i) is true if and only if there is no y such that (ii) is true. Let y-[w, z~,
where w has dimensions (I, M x S) and z (1, H). Then (ii) says that wBfzC - 0, wbfzc G 0,
w,z10.
Let 1~.) be the indicator function. The system wB -F zC - 0 can be rewritten as: for every
mEM,nENanES":
' L. LTUm(s)I(m-7~a"~a"~a"-a") f L. ~ Zn(sn)l~r-n.a"-n") - ~'
jEM aES iEN n~ES~
which we can write
for every m E M, n E N, an E Sn~Bn . ~ wm(s) -
zn(Qn)
{e:a~-a~}
As the right side does not depend on m, the left side must be independent of m as well. Note
also that z is not subject to other restrictions. Hence, we can write
for every rrt E M,n E Nan E Sn~9n : ~ wn`(s) - ~ wl(s).
{a:en-a~} {e:an-an}
and wB f zC - 0 is equivalent to the requirement that weights be balanced.
The system wb t zc G 0 reduces to w6 G 0 because c- 0, and can be easily transformed
into
~ ~ w„~(s)(Gg` - G;") G 0. (33)
mEM sES
Statement ( ii) of Theorem 7 is false ( and a weakly truthful equilibrium exists), if and only if,
for all vectors of balanced weights w, inequality ( 33) is never satisfied. That is,
L~ L. wm(s)(~ -~) 7 ~,
mEA1 eES
which is Definition 4. ~
6 Agents with Direct Preferences
So far, agents have only cared about money. In this section, agents also care for the action
that is chosen. Agent n's utility function is
Ui(t, s) -~ tg~n f Fe .
mEM
No restriction is placed on F.13 Thus, the direct utility that the agent receives from s may
depend both on the component under the conttol of the agent (sn) and the component under
the control of other agents (s-n).
We assume that transfers are secret. An agent observes the transfers offered to him but
not the transfers offered to the other agents. Agent n thus observes tn -{t;n}~,,,Enr,a~ES~)
13The separability assumption is probably not es.centiaL As Di~dt, Grossman, and Helpman ~6~ have shown,
the crucial results of common agency are still valid if the agent has a nonseparable utility function.
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and forms beliefs r(tn) about the transfers made to the other agents. We simplify the problem
by restricting beliefs to be passive:la
Definition 8 Agents hold passive óeliefs if r(tn) is independent of tn. A passive belief equi-
librium is a pure-strntegy perfect Bayesian equilibrium aJ the trnnsfer game in which ngents
hold passive óeliefs.
If agent n holds a passive beliefs and he observes a deviation from one of the principals, he
assumes that the principal has deviated only with him but is still offering the same transfers
to the other agents. A passive belief equilibrium is then simply a pair (t, s).
Both the assumptions of private offers and passive beliefs can be seen as arbitrary. Other
assumptions are possible, and maybe more appropriate in certain circumstances. We do
not aspire to provide a comprehensive treatment of multi-principal multi-agent games with
externalities among agents. Our goal in this section is simply to show that the logic of the
results we have obtained in the previous sections can be fruitfully extended to the case in
which agents have direct preferences.
Let a weakly truthfu! passive belief equilibrium be a pasaive belief equilibrium in which
(WT) is satisfied (as (WT) does not depend on the agents' preferences, Definition 5 applies
this section as well). Let (9n, 9-n) -(sl, ..., sn, ... , sN) be the outcome when all agents play
s~ but agent n deviates to an. We can now show that the equilibrium characterization given
in the previous sections is still valid, albeit with small modifications:
Theorem 8 A pair (t, s) oJ tmnsfers and nction profiies is the outcome oj a weakly truthful
passive belief equilibrium iJ and only if the Jollouring conditions ane satisfied:
(AM') Jor every n E N, sn E SN,
~ tán f~ i ~ t~n f~n ~-n)i
mEbf mEM
(IC') for every m E M, s E S,
cá t ~ ~ ï;~ f ~ F; ~ cá ~- ~ ~ ~n } ~ ~;~,,-~l;
nEN j~m nEN nEN j~m nEN
(CM J for every m E M, n E N,
ï~ ~.. i- ~ - maX ~ ~ tan -~ ~a ~~ l~ .
aES~
jEM j~m
Pmof: The proof is exactly the same as the proof of Theorem I, except that T;"-~j~,,,;~`
is replaced with 7;̀ n -~j~,,,;~` t~n.e-~l. ~
As a limit case, consider what happens to the conditions of Theorem 8 when there are no
principals (M - 0). The conditions (AM'), (IC'), and (CM') reduce to: for every n E N and
~~The restriction to pnssive beliefs ia common in the literoture on principel-egent modeln with one principal
nnd mnny agenta. See McAfee and Schwnrtz [10~ for n diacuesion and further referencee.
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s E S, F9 1 F~a„ à-„1. This is the necessary and sufficient condition for s to be the outcome
of a Nash-equilibrium in the game played among agents.ls
As in the previous sections, we study conditions for existence. First, we need to redefine
balancedness. The new definition is:
Definition 9 In a transfer game with direct agent preferences, the vectors w and z with
respective dimensions MS and H are said to be vectors of balnnced weights if all their elements
are nonnegative, and
for every m E M, n E N, an E Sn~sn; ~ wn`(s) - zn(an).
{s: sn -an }
A transfer game with direct agent preferences is balanced if and only tif for every pair of vectors
of balanced weights w and z we have:
~ ~ wm(s)(~ - G; ) t ~ ~ zn(sn)(F; - ~n,,--n)) ~ fi
mEM sES nEN snES~
The definition of balancedness now includes weights on agents as well as principals. This
is because, if we are considering a deviation from s to s, we have to take into account not
only the benefit of principals but also that of agents. A game is balanced (with respect to a
given action s) if, for any vector of balanced weights, the sum of the direct change in payoffs
for principals and agents of any possible deviation is negative. If F; - 0 for all agents and
all actions, we recover the definition of balancedness used in the previous section.
The main result of this section is:
Theorem 9 A transfer game with agent preferences has a weakly trathful passive belief equi-
librtium if and only if it is balanced.
Proof: The analogous of Proposition 6 can be proven for the case with externality (the proof
of this proposition follows familiar lines and is omitted):
Proposition 7 There exists a weakly truthful equilibrium with outcome s if and only if there
ezists d E RMH that satisfies
(WTd') For all s E S and all m E M,
~ d;n'c; -c;;
n:s"~à"
(AMd'J For all n E N and all sn E Sn,
~ ds"n C Fg" - F'Is~,s-n).
mEb1
~aIt is aLso easy to see that, if we take a transfer game and let all the C's tend to zero uniformly (while keeping
the F's constant), we obtain that the limit of (AM'), (IC'), and (CM') is the Nash condition. This suggests a
degree of continuity between the concept ot weakly truthful passive belief equilibrium and the concept of Nash
equilibrium. An equilibrium concept that included some form of coordination among agents may not enjoy
this property.
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We rewrite (WTd') and (AMd') in a way that fits (i) of Theorem 7. Let B, C, and b be
like in the proof of Theorem 6 but let, for all n and all s" E Sn,
C~n - Fá.. - ~a à-nl.
If we let
and
we get (i) of Theorem 7.
By Theorem 7, (i) is true if and only if there is no y such that (ii) is true. Let y-[w, zJ,
where w has dimens ons (1, M x S) and z (1, H). Then (ii) says that wBf zC - 0, wóf zc G 0,
w,z~0.
As B and C are the same as in the proof of Theorem 6, the system wB f zC - 0 is
equivalent to the requirement that
for every m E M, n E N, an E S"~9n : ~ wn`(s) - zn(an)
{a:a~-n~}
which is the definition of balanced weights when agents have direct preferences.
The system wb f zc G 0 can be transformed into
L. !.~ wm(9)(~
--'~s )~ L~ L~ zn(9n)(~! - r(aj-"1) C O,
mEM aES nEN e~ESn
which completes the pmof. ~
When agents have no direct preferences, it is not true anymore that balancedness implies
efficiency. There can exist a weakly truthful equilibrium which is not efficient. This, in turn,
implies that weakly truthful equilibria are not generically unique anymore. The following
example illustrates both these facts:
Example Consider a game with two agents, two principals, and two actions per agent.
Each agent can say "red" or "blue". The agents' preferences are: (F;,. - 1,Fr, - 1);
(Fr,b - 0,F;b- 0); (Fti ,. - 0, Fti,. - U); (Fti6- 2,Fy6- 2). The principals' preferences
are: (G,i.,r - x, C:,r - ~); (G,i.,b - 0, G,6- 0); (Gb,. - 0, Cb,r - ~); (G6.6 - ~, Gn,n - x),
where x~ 0. Hence, the efficient outcome is (r, r). It is easy to see that, if x C 2, both (b, 6)
and (r, r) satisfy balancedness and, hence, there are two weakly truthful equilibria outcomes.
Agents are playing a pure coordination game with two equilibria: one efficient and one inef-
ficient. When x~ 2, the equilibrium with (b, 6) disappears. Only if principals have enough
interest in the game, the inefficient equilibrium disappears.
However, there exists a simple (but strong) sufficient condition to restore efficiency and
uniqueness:
Corollary S If there exists an e,~cient action s' such that, for all n E N and all s E S,
Fiá,.,,,-„1 does not depend on s-n, then nll weakly truthful passive belief equilibrin are ej~icient.
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ProoJ: Let s be the outcome of a weakly truthful passive belief equilibrium. Consider a vector
of balanced weights in which wn`(s) - 1 if s- s' and zn(s") - 1 1{ sn - s'n, with all the
other weights equal to zero. For this set of weights, balancedness requires
~ ~(~ - Gs ) f ~ (F; - Flé~ à-nl) ~ 0
mEMsES nEN
which, because of the assumption of the corollary, rewrites as
~ ~(G; -G;.)f ~(F; -F,n.)~0
mEMsES nEN
This is true only if s is efficient. ~
The last corollazy is the generalization of Segal [12, Proposition 3] to a multiple-principal
environment. If there is only one principal, it is immediate to see that all equilibria are weakly
truthful (or do not differ from a weakly truthful equilibrium in a payoff-relevant way). Then,
Corollary 3 reduces to: If there exist an efficient action s' such that, for all n E N and all
s E S, F(a,~ s-nl does not depend on s-n, then all equilibria are efficient.
7 Mixed-Strategy Equilibria
We have seen several examples, by now, showing that existence of equilibria is not ensured
with pure strategies only. We provide here a general existence result. To do this, we define the
problem as a game with endogenous sharing rules. (see Simon and Zame, [13]). We recall that
an M-players game with an endogenous sharing rule is a tuple I' - (TI, ... ,TM, Q) consisting
of a strategy space Tm for each player, and a payoff correspondence Q : Tl x...TM -~ RM.
A sharing rule is a Borel measurable selection from the correspondence Q; i.e. is a Borel
measurable function q: T-~ RM such that q(t) E Q(t) for each t E T. A solution for I' is
a sharing rule and a mixed strategy profile such that, given the sharing rule, each player's
action is a best response to the mixed strategy of the other players.
Simon and Zame [13] provide a general existence result for a large class of games with
endogenous shazing rules that satisfy the following conditions:
1. there is a dense subset T' of the product of the strategy spaces T, and a bounded
continuous function ~: S' y RM;
2. C~ is the correspondence whose graph is the closure of the graph of ~, and Q(t) is the
convex hull of C~(t) for each t.
The following existence theorem is an immediate consequence of the main theorem of
Simon and Zame (13]:
Theorem 10 The trnnsfers game has a solution in mised strategies.
Pmof: In our game, the players are the principals; the strategy space T"` of each principal is
the set [0, K]. The set T' is the set t E T:~mEM tan~~mEM t ón for every pair of actions
sn, sá and every n; that is, the set of transfers of each principal such that the best choice
of action of each player is uniquely defined. This is cleazly a dense subset of the space of
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transfers. Let the function ~ be defined for every t E T' as ~(t) - Gs: where for each agent
s'n is the action that maximizes the payoff of the agent. In addition, let the agents use the
set of correlated strategies on the actions that give equal payoff, at any vector of transfers of
the principals where this occurs. This is the convex completion of the funetion ~. It is now
immediate to check that all the conditions of the general existence theorem of Simon and
Zame are satisfied, hence an equilibrium exists. ~
A transfer game is a two-stage game. Given the principals' transfers, the second stage is a
finite game played among the agents. Let S(t) denote the set of second stage equilibria given
t. It is easy to see that S is nonempty. Moreover, with passive beliefs, for almost all t, S is
continuous in t(because each agent strictly prefers one action over the others). We can view
the principal stage as a game with M players in which S(t) is given. This game satisfies Simon
and Zame's conditions for a game with endogenous sharing rules and therefore is guaranteed
to have an equilibrium. The equilibrium will include a sharing rule that dictates what each
agent should do in case she is indifferenet between two actions.
To illustrate mixed-strategy equilibria, reconsider the example of Opposite Interest Game
of Section 4. For that game, we have shown that there does not exist a pure-strategy equi-
librium. Theorem 10 guarantees the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium. It turns out
that there exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium as follows: The first principal makes a transfer
0, s, 0, 0 with robabilit 1 2 F s s( ) P Y( ~ ) ( )-3-s
and a tranfer
(0, 0, 0, s) with probability (1~2)F(s) - 3ss,
in both cases with s E[0, 3~2]. The second principal makea a tranfer
t t, 0 with robabilit G t
3~2
( ~0, ) P Y ( )- 2-t
again with t E[0, 3~2].
8 Sequential Version
In the trasfer game that has been considered so far, all principals play aimultaneously. One
may suspect that it is this simultaneity that drives the inefficiency results. We devote this
section to variations of the original game in which principals make their offera sequentially
rather than simultaneously. The goal of the section is to show that our inefficiency results
aze robust.
The transfer game that we have used so far is simultaneous in two ways: (1) All principals
make their offers to one specific agent simultaneously; (2) A specific principal makes his offers
to all agents simultaneously. In the next two sections we modify (1) and (2) one at a time. In
5ubsection 8.1 we eliminate (1) and assume instead that principals take turns making their
offers. Principal m goes first, then Principal m- 1, all the way down to principal 1. In the
end, agents make their choices. We refer to this timing as principal sequentiality. Instead, in
Subsection 8.2 we eliminate (2) and we assume that all principals make offers to one agent,
who chooses his action, then all principals make offers to another agent, who makes his choice,
and so on for all agents. We label this second type of sequential timing ngent sequentiality.
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Of the three examples discussed in the introduction: lobbying has been modeled both in
a simultaneous fashion (e.g. Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman [6)) and in a principal-sequential
manner (Groseclose and Snyder [7]); supply contracts have been studied in the simultaneous
framework (Bernheim and Whinston [4]) and in a principal-sequential framework (e.g. Aghion
and Bolton (1]) with the idea that one manufacturer is the incumbent and enjoys a first-mover
advantage; multiple auctions are naturally studied in an agent-sequential model, although we
aze aware of no such work.
8.1 Principal Sequentiality
Action sets of the agents and of the principals are defined as in the common agency game
we have considered so far. But in the sequential common agency game principals move
sequentially.
The M-th principal moves first and principal 1 moves last. Each principal announces a
vector tn` E RS of transfers to each agent; this announcement is commonly observed. Then
the next principal does the same. Finally, agents move simultaneously choosing the action.
The equilibrium set can be characterized using the basic idea of principal agent problems.
For every m E{1,..., M} and any vector of transfers (tk,...,tht), we denote the subgame
beginning after that vector of transfers has been announced by I'(tk, ..., tM). For any such
vector of transfers, and for every subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the game induced
by this vector there is a set of actions chosen as equilibrium outcome of that subgame. We
denote the set of all such actions as rl(tk, ..., tM).
Take the principal m who is moving in the subgame P(tn`t~ .. , tM). We may think that
in solving the backwards induction problem this principal is choosing his transfer tn` nnd the
action profile of the agents, provided the choice of this pairs satisfies the incentive constraint
that the chosen action is an equilibrium in the subgame beginning at (tn`,... , tM).
So m is solving the problem:
max(G; - ~ ten)
aES nEN
subject to the constraint that :
(34)
s E rl(tn`, . . , tM).
To study the equilibria of the game, consider first the principal who is moving last (that is,
the principal 1). He is taking as given the vector (tz,...,t~r) of transfers of the previous
principals, and is solving:
SUbjeCt t0:
max (Ge, - ~ t;~ ) (35)
alES,ttER~ EN
s1 E rl(tl, . .. , tM). (36)
If we denote by C(t2,...,t~t,s1) the minimum cost for principal 1 to implement s~, that is
the value of the problem:
min ~ t;; , subject to s1 E rt(t1, ... , tM), (37)
GiERC nEN
the problem of principal 1 is equivalent to
maxG;i - C(t2, ..,tM, sl). (38)
a~
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But sl E g(t1,...,tM) if and only if s;, maximizes the payoff to agent n for every n, that is





for every s;, E Sn and every n. Hence it is easily seen that:
G(t2, .. , tM, s') - ~[max I G~ f~ t;~ I- I G~ f~ t;~ I ]. (40)
e„ ` j- J ` j- J
The term ~nmaX,~ (C;," t~MZ;n) is a constant in sl, and therefore the set of actions
chosen at a SPE by the principal 1 in the subgame P(t~, ..., tM) is the set of solutions of
M
max(G;, f ~ (Goi` t ~ t';~)).
" nEN j-2
(41)
In the case of the sequential game with a single agent, the reasoning above extends to all the
principals. In Eact one can prove:
Proposition 8 For any m and any (tn`tl, .. , tM), the action sm is a solution of the problem:
nf
max(~ Gsm t ~ tá,,)
j-0 j-mt1
(42)
if nnd only {f sn` E rl(tn`t1,...,tM) for a SPE of the game I'(tmtl,
,tM)
Here tj denotes the vector of transfers (one transfer for each action) to the single agent.
A corollary of this proposition is obtained considering the case m- M. In this case the
proposition implies that all the SPE equilibrium outcomes of the sequential game with one
agent are efficient:
Theorem 11 If there is only one agent, in nny SPE the agent chooses the efficient action.
Details of the proof ate given in Prat and Rustichini (11], who consider the single agent
game extensively. The proposition 8 does not generalize to the case of many agents. To see
why, consider the problem of the principal 2, the second to last to move. For a given vector
(t3, . .., tM) the problem of minimum cost to implement an action profile 6 is mintn ~nEN tán
subject to the constraint that s solves (41), that is subject to:
M M
Gs ~ ~ (Go~ t ~ t',-~ ) ~ G;~ f ~ (Ga` -f- ~ t;~ ) (43)
nEN j-2 nEN j-2
for every s'. This is a form different from the one in 39 for the last principal. So the minimum
cost has a form different from 40. The formula for the minimum caet in a special case is given
below.
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For the given vector s we denote, for each s E S, D(s) -{n E N: sn ~ sn}, and for any
matrix (Fs)aEs
FI - max F,.
{e:o(a)cI}




F; f~ t;., ~ F, -~ ~ t;., for all s E S
nEN - nEN






xI ? FI - F; for nll I C N, (46)
where xj - ~nEJ
xn'
Note that the probl m 45 defines the least core of the game where thevalue of the coalition !
isFl-F;.




So we assume without loss of generality that the solution t of the problem (44) satisfies the
condition (47). We call now xn the non-zero coordinate of the vector f, that is t;... The





Fó t~ xn ~ F, -~ ~ x", for all s E S. (48)
nEN {n:an-án}
Now observe that
max (Fj f xI ),
{ICN}
max(Fa t ~ xn) - max ( max F, ~- xI)
e {n:a~-à~} {ICN} {a:D(a)CI}
(49)
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since x is non-negative. So (48) is equivalent to
xNfF;?F~tx~forall7CN
hence our claim. ~
In the case of the game with two principals from the previous discussion we have:
Proposition 9 In the game with two pnncipnl.s nnd two agents, the action profile s is an
equiltibrium outcome if nnd only if it is the solution oj
mau G;~ - ~ t;~ (50)
e2 n
subject to:
~ t~ ~ (Ga, } ~ G~) - (Ga~ } ~~) } ~ tan (51)
n n n n
fOr eUe11J 9 .
Consider now the problem of lemma (2) in the case of two agents. It is easy to see that
(writing a~ - Fj - F; the problem
minx12 sub. to xl ~ al,x2 1 n~ x12 ~ al~,
has value:
max{ai t a2,a12}.
This gives an explicit solution to the cast minimzation problem of principal 2. Let for any
matrix payoff G'
RGI,i ,~l - {sÉ~} ~'~''~1'
C~,i'a'1 - {ms } G('~','}'
and
MG'{,, ,~1 - max G(,~ á'};
{s'ESI,á'E5~}
thc matrices obtained taking the maximum along rows and columns and the overall maximum,
respectively, and the matrix
B; - max{MG'„ RG', f CG', - G`,.}
The transfer of minimum cost for principal 2 among those that make principal 1 choase the
action profile s is easily found to be, from lemma (2),
max{MG; - G;, RG; t CG; - 2G;.}
An easy computation now shows that:
Corollary 4 The action pmfile s is an equilibrium outcome of the sequential game if and
only if it solves:
max(~G~ f G; f G; - B; ) (52)
n
In pnrticular n su~cient condítion for the equilibrium outcome to 6e e~tcient is that the
strategic bias matrix Bá is constant.
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Example If the payoff matrices aze:
L R
T 3,0 0,2
B 0, 2 0, 2





so the equilibrium is efficient if principal 1 is the last to move. The equilibrium is inefficient




The reason for the inefficiency is cleaz: when the principal 1 moves first, he will only make
transfers, if any, on the first action of both agents. But the sum of these transfers can at
most be 3, at equilibrium, since this principal can always insure a non-negative payoff. In
particular, at least one of the two transfers must be less than 2. But then the principal 2 can
get a gross payoff of 2, and a positive net payoff, rather than zero by beating such transfer.
One may conjecture that for every transfer game played in a principal-sequential fashion
there exists an ordering of principals such that the game has an efficient subgame-perfect
equilibrium. However, this conjecture is incorrect, as the following example shows. Each
agent has three actions and the payoff function is:
L C R
T 3, 3 0, 5 5, 0
M 0,5 0,0 0,0
L 5, 0 0, 0 0, 0
For both possible ordering of principals, if the efficient outcome (T, L) were supported by a
SPE, the first moving principal would have to pay at least 2t2 to guard against deviations
by the second mover, but this is cleazly not optimal because she can always get at least zero.
8.2 Agent Sequentiality
In the case of agent sequent.iality, the timing is as follows. All principals make offers to Agent
1 and Agent 1 chooses an action sl. Then, all principals learn what action Agent 2 has chosen
and make offers to Agent 2, who in turn chooses an action s2. The game continues in this
fashion until the last agent, n. When all agents have chosen their actions, Principal m E M
receives net payoff G; -~nEN tm". The transfer game with agent sequentiality can be seen as
a sequence of M common agency games. Each common agency game has the same principals
but different agents.
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Example Let us consider the already familiar Opposite Interest Game with two principals,
two agents, and two actions per agent, that has the following payoff matrix:
L R
T 0, 3 2, 0
B 2,0 2,0
In the simultaneous case, we have seen that the Opposite Interest Game does not a have
a pure-strategy equilibrium. Hence, the outcome is inefficient. We now look at the agent-
sequential version to see if the inefficiency persists. Given the symmetry of the payoff matrix
with respect to the two agents, the order of the agents is inconsequential. For concreteness,
assume that principals first make offers to Agent 1, then to Agent 2.
The outcome of a subgame perfect equilibrium of the agent-sequential version of the Op-
posite Interest Game cannot be (T, L). To see this, examine the two possible subgames of the
second stage. If Agent 1 has chosen B, then in the second stage both principals are indifferent
as to what Agent 2 chooses. If Agent 2 has chosen T, then the second stage is an auction in
which principal 1 has valuation 2 and Principal 2 has valuation 3. Principal 2 wins and must
pay at least 2. Thus, we can substitute the second stage payoffs in the Srst stage. If Agent
1 chooses T, the payoffs are (0,1). If he chooses B, they are (2, 0). Thus, the first stage is
an aiiction in which Principal 1 has valuation 2 and Principal 2 has valuation 1. Principal 1
must win, which shows that the outcome of a SPE cannot be (T, L).
This example shows that the inefficiency that is present in simultaneous transfer games not
only persists in the agent-sequential case but it can also become more severe. In the Opposite
Ineterest Game, in the simultaneous case the outcome is (T, L) with positive ptobability. In
the sequential case, it is never (T, L) and, thus, it is always inefficient.
It is interesting to contrast these observations with Bergemann and Vëlimëki [2). They
consider a dynamic common agency game, in which a set of principals face the same agent
repeatedly. At each time, principals make offers to the agent contingent on the action that
the agent chooses at the present time. The agent's and principals' payoff functione depend
on time, the current action chosen by the agent, and all the previous actions chosen by the
agent. Thus, in making their offers, principals must take into account the future effect of
the current action chosen by the agent. Similarly, in choosing the current action, the agent
does not only take into account current contributions and current direct payoff, but he must
also consider the future effect of the current action. Bergemann and Vë,limi;ki prove that
all Markov-perfect equilibria in ttuthful strategies of the dynamic common agency game are
efficient.
The difference between Bergemann and Vëlimiiki's dynamic common agency and an agent-
sequential transfer game is that in their model there is a unique agent. Let us look at a
modification of the example above that fits Bergemann and Viilimiilci's framework. Suppose
that the payoff is as above. The game is played in an agent-sequential manner. However, we
suppose that Agent 1 and Agent 2 are the same person, so that there is a unique agent who
maximizes the undiscounted sum of the transfers received at time 1 and at time 2.
Bergemann and Vfiliméilci predict that this game has a truthful equilibrium that induces
the efficient outcome and indeed we can construct such equilibrium. If the agent chooses T
in time 1, then he gets a transfer of 2 at time 2. If the agent chooses B at time 1, then he
gets a payoff from transfers of 0 at time 2. At time 1, Principal 2 must offer at least 2 more
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than Principal 1 in order to induce the agent to choose B. There exists a subgame perfect
equilibrium in which tT - 0, tB - 2, tï - tR - 2, and the agent chooses (T, L).
9 Conclusions
The main lesson of this analysis is that in games played by agents there may exist a type of
inefficiency that is absent when either there is only one agent (Bernheim and Whinston [3])
or there is only one principal (Segal [12]). We may call it a strategic ine~cáency. We have
identified a condition in terms of game balancedness for this inefficiency to exist .
In the three examples provided ín the Introduction, the presence of a strategic ineff~ciency
is important for policy purposes. In lobbying, common agency.telLs us that if all citizens are
represented by lobbies, all lobbies can make contributions, and there aze no transaction costs,
then the outcome of a`pure corruption' model is always efficient (in a utilitarian sense). Our
analysis says that this result is not true anymore if we take into account the multiplicity of
policy-makers.
In supply contracts, if there is only one retailer, unrestricted vertical contracting leads
to optimal allocations (Bernheim and Whinston (4, Proposition 1]). This result supports
the view that a firm cannot profitably use exclusive dealings to foreclose a rival. However,
our analysis suggets that that result does not extend to the case with multiple retailers, in
which, even with unrestricted bilateral vertical contracting, the equilibrium may be inefficient.
Indeed, in 5ubsection 4.2 we showed that the Opposite Interest Game, which has no efficient
equilibrium, may be reinterpreted as a vertical supply problem.
In auctions, Subsection 8.2 has shown that a sequence of efficient suctions (in the sense
that each auction assigns the object to the bidder with the highest valuation - which includes
the bidder's sttategic considerations) is not guaranteed to be efficient. Hence, a governement
who - say - privatizes some assets through several rounds of auctions, should be aware of the
possibility of strategic inefficiencies.
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